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Article Summary 
Meta-metaphysics concerns the nature and methodology of metaphysics and metaphysical inquiry. 
The emergence of meta-metaphysics as a systematic area of study is relatively recent, going back to 
the late 1990s. But the issues pursued in meta-metaphysics are certainly not novel: an age old 
question about the nature of metaphysics is whether it is possible to obtain knowledge about 
metaphysical matters in the first place, and if it is, how this knowledge is obtained. 
 The contemporary trend in meta-metaphysics was largely inspired by a well-known debate 
between Rudolf Carnap and W.V. Quine. This debate focused on the notion of existence and the 
seemingly problematic commitment to the existence of things that, on the face of it, do not exist, such 
as fictional entities or abstract entities such as numbers. But important as this issue is, contemporary 
meta-metaphysics has a much broader focus: it attempts to situate the field of metaphysics both 
within philosophy and within human inquiry more broadly speaking. Hence, meta-metaphysics has 
close ties to epistemology and philosophy of science, given that a central question in this area is how, 
or whether, metaphysical inquiry differs from scientific inquiry. 
 One issue that may cause confusion is that the terms ‘meta-metaphysics’ and ‘metaontology’ 
are often used synonymously. But there are good reasons to distinguish them. Metaontology has a 
somewhat stricter focus and continues the tradition of the Quine-Carnap debate; it concerns issues 
such as the problems related to quantifying over abstract or non-existent entities. Meta-metaphysics 
also involves other themes than those already mentioned (see Tahko 2015). These include the 
definition of metaphysical and ontological realism, the discussion surrounding metaphysical 
grounding and fundamentality (see Bliss and Trogdon 2016), and the epistemology of metaphysics 
more broadly conceived. 
 
1. Meta-metaphysics vs. metaontology 
The term ‘meta-metaphysics’ is sometimes used synonymously with another term, ‘metaontology’. 
Indeed, those who find the term ‘meta-metaphysics’ somewhat ugly often replace it with 
‘metaontology’. However, there is a principled reason to distinguish between these terms in 
contemporary use. The reason is that meta-metaphysics may be understood to be a broader term 
than metaontology. More precisely, meta-metaphysics encompasses metaontology, but also covers 
other issues. The distinction can be straight-forwardly made by following the distinction between 
metaphysics and ontology.  
 The term ‘metaphysics’ has an Aristotelian origin and is sometimes described as the “the most 
general investigation possible into the nature of reality” (see the entry on “Metaphysics”). The term 
‘ontology’, however, has a more specific Aristotelian origin, as the Greek ‘onta’ refers to ‘being’, hence 
ontology is the study of being “as it is in itself”, as Aristotle might have put it. So, ontology could be 
thought to concern what exists, whereas metaphysics also concerns how it exists (see the entry on 
“Ontology”). The distinction between metaphysics and ontology is, however, vague at best, since 
many authors use the terms interchangeably. Accordingly, similar vagueness affects the distinction 
between metaontology and meta-metaphysics.  
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But what is metaontology? The first systematic use of the term is thought to be Peter van 
Inwagen’s 1998 article of the same title (see van Inwagen 1998). In van Inwagen’s usage, the term 
‘metaontology’ is closely related to Quine’s work. Quine considered the central question of ontology 
to be ‘What is there?’ (see Quine 1948). Van Inwagen’s question is what it is that we are asking when 
we ask ‘What is there?’, and this seems to go beyond the ontological question, hence metaontology. 
This Quinean origin of metaontology is widely recognised, but van Inwagen’s understanding of the 
term ‘metaontology’ is quite strict: it concerns quantification and ontological commitment (we will 
return to these in section 2, see also the entry on “Ontological commitment”).  
Although the common understanding of the term ‘metaontology’ is Quinean in spirit, it is 
worth noting that if one disagrees with Quine about the task of ontology, then the area of 
metaontology might also have to be reconsidered. Since metaontology concerns the methodology of 
ontology, changing the task of ontology might also entail a change of methodology. One alternative 
approach, perhaps more Aristotelian in spirit, would be to give a more central position to a type of 
inquiry known as formal ontology. This term of art does not refer to ontology conducted with formal 
methods (although it could involve such methods), rather, it refers to the study of ontological form, 
which concerns the structures and relations that ontological elements (such as objects) stand in. The 
terminology has a Husserlian origin (see Smith and Mulligan 1983). More generally, ontology 
understood in this fashion involves an examination of the categorical structure of reality – a task which 
goes back to Aristotle’s Categories. One contemporary example of the systematic study of ontological 
categories in this sense is E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (see Lowe 2006, see also the entry on 
“Categories”). 
The most influential contribution to meta-metaphysics is perhaps the 2009 Metametaphysics 
anthology (Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman 2009). The focus of this anthology is, by and large, the 
area of Quinean metaontology as defined above, although the Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) 
understanding also receives some space. 
 
2. Historical background: Quine vs. Carnap on existence and ontological commitment 
The historical origins of meta-metaphysics are typically traced back to the debate between W. V. 
Quine and Rudolf Carnap in the 1940s and 1950s. We can introduce this debate by considering the 
status of existence questions such as ‘Do numbers exist?’. Given that numbers are typically thought 
to be abstract objects (see the entry on “Abstract objects”), what does their existence amount to? 
Moreover, when we ask such questions, are they in fact merely conceptual, to be settled by linguistics 
rather than genuine metaphysics? Carnap is famously considered as having been sceptical about the 
metaphysical import of such existence questions, arguing that there is nothing substantial at stake 
when we ask them. The resulting view is a type of language pluralism, according to which we can 
choose our ontological framework – our preferred language – liberally (see Eklund 2013). This, at any 
rate, is symptomatic of the view of some contemporary philosophers who identify themselves as (neo-
)Carnapian. As a result of the dismissive view regarding metaphysical questions associated with 
Carnap, Quine has emerged as the hero in defence of the possibility of metaphysics, because he 
introduced a systematic way to analyse existence questions. 
 Quine’s famous article ‘On What There Is’ (Quine 1948) is considered the definitive work 
against the Carnapian view that ontological questions are a matter of (linguistic) preference. Quine’s 
article is commonly considered to have once again made ontology a respectable discipline after the 
devastating effects of logical positivism – an approach that Carnap supported (see the entry on 
“Logical positivism”). However, Quine himself may have had a considerably more deflationary attitude 
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towards metaphysics than many contemporary metaphysicians and especially the neo-Aristotelians 
do (see Fine 2009). So, there are some reasons to think that the disagreement about ontology 
between Quine and Carnap was not as deep as it is sometimes played out to be. 
 The most important meta-metaphysical theme of the Quine-Carnap debate is precisely the 
role and interpretation of existence questions in ontology. This theme is still central in meta-
metaphysics. Another central theme that we can trace back to Quine and Carnap is the role and 
interpretation of the first-order existential quantifier. If ontology is the study of what exists, then the 
answer to Quine’s ontological question, ‘What is there?’, is not very difficult: everything exists. This is 
the rather anticlimactic starting point of Quine’s famous 1948 paper, ‘On What There Is’. It might 
appear that this answer is immediately unsatisfactory. Consider Sherlock Holmes and other such 
fictional entities that, on the face of it, do not exist, but nevertheless appear to be something. The 
important meta-metaphysical input of the Quinean position is the thesis that being is the same as 
existence, that is, there are no things that do not exist. On this view, saying that ‘There are numbers’ 
is on a par to saying ‘Numbers exist’. 
 Another important aspect of the Quinean view is that all things that exist do so in the same 
fashion, univocally. So, when we ascribe existence to material objects such as tables and chairs and to 
abstract objects such as numbers or sets, we supposedly mean the same thing by ‘existence’. The 
supposed argument in favour of this view is simple: it is the same thing, or at least close enough, to 
say that unicorns do not exist and that the number of unicorns is zero. The upshot of this picture – the 
Quinean method – is that the core questions of ontology can be answered with a simple formula (see 
van Inwagen 1998): 
 (1) Take your best scientific theory and assume that what this theory says is true. 
 (2) Translate the sentences of your theory into a formal language, typically first-order 
 predicate logic. 
 (3) The domain of (existential) quantification in your translated theory will give you the 
 ontological commitments of that theory. 
 It is especially the third point, concerning ontological commitment, which expresses an 
important and much debated meta-metaphysical position. Quine, being a nominalist, resisted the idea 
that we could quantify over abstract entities such as fictional entities or universals (see the entry on 
“Nominalism”). Quine’s reason to resist quantification over abstract entities derives from his view 
regarding the role of quantification itself, namely that quantification is intimately linked to ontological 
commitment. More precisely, the quantified sentences of a theory express the ontological 
commitments of the theory. The existentially-committing reading of the first-order existential 
quantifier can however be challenged (see Priest 2008). 
 In contrast to Quine, Carnap regarded abstract objects such as numbers unproblematic. 
Carnap’s position relies on his distinction between internal and external questions (see Carnap 1950). 
Importantly, only internal questions are to be understood as factual. These are typically scientific 
questions which we can answer on the basis of empirical methods available in our scientific 
framework. Questions like ‘What is the smallest prime number?’ would also qualify as internal, but in 
this case the answer is analytically true or false. For instance, Carnap would consider all mathematical 
truths to be analytically true, so true in virtue of meaning, similarly in the case of the famous ‘All 
bachelors are unmarried’ (see the entry on “Analyticity”). 
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 Carnap’s external questions concern the framework itself: they are philosophical or 
ontological questions about the nature and, perhaps, justification of the whole framework. We might 
think that external questions should be raised when introducing a new framework, such as a specific 
scientific theory. Accordingly, on one reading, the problematic question: ‘Do numbers exist?’ would 
count as internal, but trivial (because analytic). On another reading, it could count as an external 
question, but on that reading Carnap would not regard the question as substantive. Even though 
Carnap thinks that we can freely adopt novel frameworks without an empirical justification, the 
external questions that we ask outside the scientific framework are to be considered merely a matter 
of pragmatic preference, without objective true/false answers. 
 In contemporary meta-metaphysics, these issues have been taken up in discussions of 
quantifier variance, the view that there is no uniquely best ontological language for describing the 
world. Carnap is sometimes interpreted as the grandfather of the quantifier variance view, since it is 
a close relative of the idea that at least some of our ontological disputes (such as perhaps the one 
about numbers) are merely verbal or conventional, lacking objective true/false answers (see Hirsch 
2009 for a defence of quantifier variance). The competing view, closer to the Quinean position, 
suggests that there is a single best quantifier meaning. In other words, quantification ‘carves at the 
joints’, which is to say that it latches on to the structure of reality in a reliable manner, it tells us 
something about how things really are in reality (see Sider 2011 for a defence of this view; see also 
the entry on “Realism and antirealism”). 
 
3. The relationship between metaphysics and science 
In this final section, we will focus on one important theme in contemporary meta-metaphysics, the 
relationship between metaphysics and science. The discussion surrounding this theme is often 
conducted under the rubric of ‘naturalistic metaphysics’. This is arguably a topic that has received the 
most attention in recent meta-metaphysics, especially following the influential book Every Thing Must 
Go (see Ladyman and Ross 2007). 
 The general pattern of the dialogue is as follows. Philosophers of science (especially 
philosophers of physics) and scientifically-oriented metaphysicians have raised concerns about the 
methods of contemporary analytic metaphysics. These concerns focus on the use of non-empirical 
methods such as thought experiments, intuitions, and a priori reasoning. Further, the challenge 
continues, when input from the sciences is considered, it is typically based on caricatures or results 
that do not go beyond “A-level chemistry” (again, see Ladyman and Ross 2007, Chapter 1). 
Accordingly, all the latest results from contemporary science, such as those of quantum mechanics, 
are largely ignored. Given that metaphysicians pursue questions concerning the nature of change, 
time, and the ultimate constituents of reality, it would seem that the latest results from contemporary 
science are not only useful, but necessary for successful inquiry. 
 There are at least two primary lines of response to this challenge that can be found in the 
meta-metaphysics literature. The first is to deny an important premise of the challenge, namely, that 
the methods of metaphysics and science differ significantly. One version of this response suggests that 
both disciplines rely on tools such as modeling. But how do the disciplines differ if they use the same 
tools? One difference, it may be suggested, is that metaphysics concerns matters that are prior to 
science, as it deals with topics such as the categories that physical entities may fall under (see Paul 
2012). 
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 The suggested methodological continuity between science and metaphysics is that models are 
the primary tool of theory-forming in both disciplines (again, see Paul 2012, where this suggestion is 
developed). The categories involved in metaphysical models may of course differ from those used in 
science (e.g., one would talk of properties or substances rather than of particles or genes), but 
metaphysics and science may both be seen as modeling parts of reality. Moreover, both science and 
metaphysics use a priori reasoning to infer to the best explanation, which helps us choose between 
empirically equivalent models. Theoretical virtues such as simplicity, ontological parsimony, elegance, 
explanatory power and fertility may also be used to evaluate these models. So, this strategy aims to 
bring science and metaphysics much closer together than they may have usually been thought to be, 
via a shared methodology. The subject-matters of the disciplines are however at least partially distinct, 
given that metaphysics deals with more fundamental categories of being. In a way, this response 
endorses the naturalistic challenge, but claims that metaphysics can survive it by using the same 
methods as science. 
 A different line of response takes it that both the subject-matter and the methodology of 
metaphysics and science are different (see Lowe 2011). On this line, the attempt is to undermine the 
challenge from naturalistic metaphysics by defending the priority of metaphysics somewhat more 
robustly. One way to frame this idea is to argue that before we even have a conception of the way 
things might turn out in science, we must have somehow determined what the options are. In other 
words, metaphysics can be seen as delimiting the vast space of possibilities so that we can select which 
ones to focus our efforts on. On this approach, the subject-matter of metaphysics concerns first and 
foremost the space of metaphysical possibility. This type of view would of course require a precise 
account of the relevant modal epistemology that enables us to access knowledge about such 
possibilities and it must hence face the naturalistic challenge regarding the methods of analytic 
metaphysics, such as the role of a priori reasoning and intuitions. 
 It may be tempting to attempt some kind of a synthesis of these two responses (for one such 
attempt, see Morganti and Tahko 2017). Perhaps metaphysics could be seen as prior to science in that 
metaphysics explores a space of metaphysical possibilities, laying the grounds for the interpretation 
of scientific theories. But simultaneously, some elements of science are prior to metaphysics in that 
science is needed to define that space of possibilities and also for selecting the most appropriate 
among them. On such a view, metaphysics could be conceived as telling us something about the 
nature and structure of reality, perhaps in conjunction with empirical science, but distinct from it in 
terms of its methods, in virtue of its being an essentially a priori enterprise (delimiting metaphysical 
possibilities). 
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